In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in di¤erent polluting goods. We develop a tworegion, two-good model with inter-regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top," without relying on ine¢ cient lobbying e¤orts or capital competition.
Introduction
Critical to the setting of domestic environmental policy is whether a centralized government would select more or less stringent regulations than decentralized governments. Earlier literature has suggested that decentralization can lead to a "race to the bottom," as state, provincial, or regional governments over-compete for domestic …rms and/or capital (e.g., Markusen et al., 1995; Richter and Wellisch, 1996;  Levinson, 1997; Shogren, 2002, 2005; McAusland, 2002) or cause …rms to over-invest in unproductive lobbying activities (e.g., Aidt, 1998; Fredriksson et al., 2006) , but may alternatively lead to no di¤erence in policy outcomes (e.g., Oates and Schwab, 1988; Fredricksson and Gaston, 2000) or to improvements in environmental quality through better information about local impacts, the internalization of transboundary pollution spillovers, or the capture of pollution rents by non-local capital owners (e.g., Peltzman and Tideman, 1972; Wellisch, 1995) . The results in relation to environmental policy mirror those of the local public …nance or …scal federalism literature, where decentralization can serve as a disciplinary measure against expansionary government taxation or can push governments to e¢ cient public good provision through the ability of individuals to relocate, but may alternately result in excessive tax competition to attract …rms, employment, and/or capital (Oates and Schwab, 1988) . Parallel to this, the main focus of the environmental policy literature has been on the locational decision of …rms, with governments playing the role as active seekers of employment and capital in environmental policy setting.
Empirical evidence on the impact of environmental policy decentralization has been mixed, although there is a consensus that decentralization does not necessarily lead to a "race to the bottom" as much as the theoretical literature suggests. For example, List and Gerking (2000) , using data from before and after the Reagan decentralization of environmental policy enforcement in the early 1980s, found that real pollution-abatement operating expenditures per $1000 of value-added increased for two of the four industries considered (chemical/allied products and food/kindred products) but declined in the other two sectors (primary metals and chemical/applied products). Quite consistent with this, Millimet (2003) found that environmental decentralization in the U.S. in the 1980s led to a signi…cant increase in pollution control expenditure, but per capita nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions did not signi…cantly decrease (although there may have been a reduction in the rate of deterioration). More on environmental policy than environmental outcomes, Sigman (2005) has suggested that free riding by state governments does occur in water pollution control and, speci…cally, that states which control their Clean Water Act programs free ride on downstream states, implying that centralization may be warranted if the cost of free-riding outweighs the greater ‡exibility and informational advantages of decentralization.
A perusal of recent environmental indicators from the World Bank, across di¤erent pollutants and among di¤erent countries, illustrates a similar ambiguity (see Table 1 ). For example, among the 30 OECD countries, the 9 countries generally identi…ed as federations have average carbon dioxide emissions per capita of 11.4 metric tonnes and nationally protected area (as a share of total land area) of 15.7%, 1 while the countries identi…ed as having centralized governments have lower average carbon dioxide emissions per capita (9.2 metric tonnes) but a lower average percentage of nationally protected area (12.8%). In terms of outcomes, centralized regimes thus have better carbon emissions per capita but protect less of their land area. Fertilizer consumption (hundred grams per hectare of arable land) is also very much lower among federations (1341 to 3627), but particulate matter emissions (urban-population-weighted average, g=m 3 ) are virtually identical (25.7 to 25.2). This inconsistency occurs across pollutants for non-OECD countries as well. It appears, at least on the surface, that decentralization does not even lead to consistent environmental outcomes within a country: some pollutants may by higher with decentralization while others are lower.
In this paper, we revisit the theoretical question about the environmental implications of policy decentralization, focusing on the role of productivity gaps and pollution spillovers, in an attempt to provide a plausible explanation for the observed policy inconsistency. Speci…cally, we address the following questions:
(1) How does comparative advantage across regions a¤ect environmental policy and damages? (2) What are the di¤erences in the patterns of environmental policy between centralism and federalism when regions are relatively better at producing di¤erent polluting goods? (3) How does harmonization of centralized policy impact the environment? (4) With multiple goods and multiple pollutants (and therefore potentially multiple taxes), how do environmental damages di¤er between federalism and centralism?
We use a model comprising a single country with two regions, two (non-numeraire) goods produced by perfectly competitive industries and a numeraire good. Each region produces both non-numeraire goods but has a comparative advantage in one of them. The numeraire good is assumed to be non-polluting and freely traded while the two non-numeraire goods generate di¤erent pollutants, which may be transboundary, and are thus subject to environmental taxes. We consider a two-stage game under two government structures: federalism (or decentralization) and centralism. In the …rst stage, either the centralized government sets environmental taxes to levy on the two polluting goods in each region to maximize national welfare (under centralism), or each of the two regional governments sets its own taxes to maximize regional welfare (under federalism). Under the centralized policy regime, we also consider the case in which the central government chooses to harmonize taxes within each sector between the two regions. In the second stage of the game, given the environmental taxes and the structure of government (centralism versus federalism), production, inter-regional transfers of goods across regions, and consumption take place. In the discussion of the di¤erences in taxes and damages between regimes, we describe three distinct e¤ects: an inter-regional environmental e¤ ect from cross-border pollution spillovers which tends to push up taxes, an intra-regional environmental e¤ ect between sectors within a region which has an ambiguous impact on taxes, and an inter-regional trade e¤ ect from consumption in which tends to lower taxes.
C o u ntry N a tio n a lly P ro te c te d A re a C O 2 E m issio n s P e r C a p ita Fe rtiliz e r C o n su m p tio n P a rtic u la te M a tte r We consider a country with two regions (A and B) and three goods (a numeraire good and two nonnumeraire goods which we label a and b). Region A has a comparative advantage in the production of a while region B has a comparative advantage in the production of b. We assume perfect competition in all markets but allow for the production of each of the two non-numeraire goods to generate pollution which may have transboundary e¤ects. The presence of pollution calls for policy intervention and we consider non-prohibitive environmental taxes (t) that could be imposed on producers either by the central government or by the local government.
On the demand side, we have quasi-linear preferences represented by
where c = [c a ; c b ] is the consumption vector for the two non-numeraire goods, c 0 denotes the consumption of the numeraire good, and v(c) is quadratic and additively separable in the non-numeraire goods. The demand for good i (i = a; b) in region j (j = A; B) is then given by
On the supply side, as in Horn et al. (2007) , labour (l) is the only factor of production which is employed in the production of the numeraire good according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology and in the production of each of the two non-numeraire goods according to a decreasing-returns-to scale technology.
Speci…cally, non-numeraire good i is produced in region j according to x the marginal product of labour in the production of the numeraire good is one and the supply of labour is su¢ ciently large that production is positive at all times, we have that the equilibrium wage is equal to one and the total supply of non-numeraire good i is equal to
where t j i denotes the environmental tax producers of good i face in region j.
Assuming that (1) each unit of production generates one unit of pollution, (2) pollution may be transboundary, (3) each production process entails a di¤erent pollutant, and (4) environmental damages are separable in pollutants and quadratic in their levels, we can write the environmental damage function in region j as
for j = A; B, where s 2 [0; 1] and measures the extent to which pollution generated in the other ( j) region travels to region j so that the higher the s, the more transboundary pollution is. As we have two polluting production processes and thus two pollutants, we can allow for the transboundary nature of the two pollutants to di¤er by indexing s with the subscript i (i = a; b).
Our framework of analysis involves two stages: in the …rst stage, environmental taxes are set to maximize welfare de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax revenues minus environmental damage; in the second stage, consumption and production decisions take place under the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive. For the …rst stage, we consider two scenarios: in one case, policy is set centrally so that the objective function includes both the welfare of region A and the welfare of region B; in the other case, policy is set locally at the regional level so that the objective function includes only the welfare of the region in which environmental policy is being introduced.
Consumption and Production Stage
In this subsection, we look at the second stage of the model and solve for equilibrium prices and quantities for given environmental taxes. Under zero transportation costs,
, that is, the price consumers pay for good i is the same independently of where it is produced, and we can thus omit the superscript j and express the price of good i simply as p i . Market clearing then requires that national demand equal national supply or
(
which gives
for i = a; b. Using that A a = B b = 1, we can express equilibrium price, production, and export levels as
Here we note that the environmental tax in the region with a comparative advantage has a stronger price e¤ect than the environmental tax in the other region. That is, the tax imposed on producers of good a in region A, for example, a¤ects the price of good a to a greater extent than the tax on producers of good a in region B. Furthermore, an environmental tax reduces production in the region in which it is levied but increases it in the other region, although the latter e¤ect is weaker (in absolute terms) than the former e¤ect. Finally, inter-regional exports are decreasing in the environmental tax imposed in the exporting region but increasing in the environmental tax imposed in the importing region, although again the dependence is weaker in the latter than in the former. For example, the tax on producers of good a in region A reduces exports of good a from region A to region B but the tax on producers of good a in region B increases exports of good a from region A to region B.
Given environmental taxes, the e¤ects of an increase in , which amounts to a reduction in comparative advantage, are less straightforward but equally unambiguous. By partial di¤erentiation of the above equilibrium price and quantity levels, we have that
and
As increases, prices and exports decline while production decreases in the region with the comparative advantage but increases in the other region. Overall, production in sector i increases as the production increase in the less e¢ cient region is larger than the production decrease in the more e¢ cient region.
Environmental Policy Stage
In this subsection, we examine the environmental policy setting stage and consider two scenarios: …rst, we have the central government determine the environmental taxes to levy in the two polluting sectors (a and b) in each of the two regions (A and B); second, we allow for each regional government to choose the environmental taxes to impose in the two sectors. Although in both cases environmental taxes are welfaremaximizing, there are two channels through which environmental policy in one region a¤ects the other region (trade and pollution movement) giving rise to e¤ects that are only taken into account by the central government and thus amount to di¤erent environmental taxes between federalism and centralism. Trade between regions connects consumers and producers in one region with the policy choice in the other region generating an inter-regional trade e¤ ect that is increasing in the level of trade activity and thus in the productivity gap between the two regions (the lower the gap is, the lower the level of trade activity and the weaker the e¤ect). Given the trade possibilities across the two regions, there also exists substitutability in production across the two regions through environmental policy. Speci…cally, environmental taxes reduce local production but increase production in the other region, and a change in production has both an environmental e¤ect through a change in emissions and a tax revenue e¤ ect through a change in tax revenues. The second channel through which environmental policy in a region a¤ects the other region is pollution movement which generates an environmental e¤ect that is increasing in how transboundary pollution is (the more transboundary pollution is, the stronger the e¤ect).
To sum up, there are three e¤ects explaining any policy divergence between centralism and federalism:
an inter-regional trade e¤ ect, which depends on the extent of trade, an inter-regional environmental e¤ ect which captures how a tax increase in a region a¤ects pollution in the other region and depends on substitutability in production between the two regions as well as on the transboundary nature of pollution, and a tax revenue e¤ ect which depends on substitutability in production between the two regions.
In technical terms, the e¤ects of t 
for j = A; B and i = a; b. Provided that some level of trade activity is present, the inter-regional trade e¤ ect increases the marginal cost of environmental taxes in sectors in which regions have a comparative advantage and decreases it otherwise. To be clear, a higher tax in region j reduces consumer surplus (through higher prices and lower consumption) and increases producer surplus (through higher prices and larger production) in region j. If region j imports from region j, that is, x j i < d (p i ), the e¤ect on consumer surplus prevails so that overall surplus decreases and the marginal cost of taxes increases.
However, if region j exports to region j, that is, x j i > d (p i ), the e¤ect on producer surplus prevails so that overall surplus increases and the marginal cost of taxes decreases.
Thus, the central government has an incentive to set lower taxes on goods regions are more e¢ cient at producing but higher taxes on goods regions are less e¢ cient at producing. Given that the tax in the region with the comparative advantage has a stronger price e¤ect than the tax in the other region, the inter-regional trade e¤ ect within a given sector is larger in the region with the comparative advantage. As the productivity gap between the two regions decreases ( j i increases), the level of exports/imports falls by (12) and the trade e¤ect thus weakens.
The inter-regional environmental e¤ ect can also amount to an increase or a decrease in the marginal cost of environmental taxes as higher taxes in region j result in less pollution spilling over into region j (spillover e¤ect) but more pollution being generated through an increase in local production in region j (own pollution e¤ect). If pollution is a pure private good, there are no spillovers and the environmental e¤ect thus increases the marginal cost of environmental taxes giving the central government an incentive to decrease taxes. However, if pollution is transboundary, the reduction in spillovers from lower production in region j may more than o¤set the increase in pollution from higher production in region j so that the marginal cost of environmental taxes decreases and the central government opts for higher taxes. The more transboundary pollution is, the larger the reduction in spillovers from lower production in region j and the stronger the central government's incentive to increase taxes; although the local production e¤ect also increases with the extent to which pollution is transboundary, the change in the spillover e¤ect dominates. Furthermore, when the own pollution e¤ect dominates so that, overall, the environmental e¤ect is positive (that is, a higher tax in region j increases environmental damages in region j), as the productivity gap between the two regions decreases, the environmental e¤ect gets stronger in sector i but can increase or decrease in sector i. Correspondingly, when the spillover e¤ect dominates so that, overall, the environmental e¤ect is negative (that is, a higher tax in region j decreases environmental damages in region j), the environmental e¤ect as the productivity gap between the two regions decreases gets stronger in sector i but can increase or decrease in sector i. In essence, a decrease in the productivity gap in sector i triggers a decrease in production in region j, which weakens the spillover e¤ect, and an increase in production in region j, which strengthens the own pollution e¤ect; a decrease in productivity gap in sector i triggers a decrease in production in region j, which weakens the own pollution e¤ect, and an increase in production in region j, which strengthens the spillover e¤ect. 2 Finally, the tax revenue e¤ ect is always positive in that a higher tax on good i in region j implies more production in region j and thus higher tax revenues; the smaller the productivity gap between the two regions is, the more region j produces in sector i and thus the larger the tax e¤ect. 2 See Appendix for a formal derivation of the impact of a change in s or on the inter-regional environmental e¤ ect.
Central Environmental Policy
Under a centralized system, a country chooses environmental taxes as to maximize its welfare which is given by the sum of the welfare levels of all of its regions. We can then express total welfare as
where t = t A a ; t A b ; t B a ; t B b is the vector of environmental taxes, consumer surplus in region j equals
tax revenue in region j is given by
and environmental damage in region j is given by (4), for j = A; B.
With environmental policy centrally set and thus maximizing the sum of region A's welfare and region B's welfare, we obtain the following equilibrium environmental taxes:
Upon inspection of the two taxes, we have
Proposition 1
The larger the pollution spillover e¤ ects of production (s i "), the more heavily production is taxed (t That an increase in s i results in tax increases in both regions is fairly straightforward: the more damaging production is for a country's environmental quality (through larger spillovers from one region to the other), the higher the environmental taxes. The e¤ects of changes in j i on taxes are however complicated by the presence of two o¤setting e¤ects as production changes have implications not only for local pollution but also for pollution in the other region. A decrease in the productivity gap in sector i (that is, an increase in j i ), triggers a production decrease in the more e¢ cient region and a production increase in the less e¢ cient region. Less production in the more e¢ cient region means that less pollution spills over into the less e¢ cient region but, overall, pollution does increase in the latter region even in the extreme case when pollution is a pure public bad as, by (11), the production increase in this region exceeds the production decrease in the other region, and the environmental tax thus always increases in the less e¢ cient region.
On the other hand, the pollution level in the more e¢ cient region decreases from lower local production but increases from higher production in the other region through spillovers; the stronger the spillover e¤ects, the more likely the positive e¤ect on pollution dominates so that the environmental tax in the more e¢ cient region also increases; alternatively, when spillover e¤ects are weak, the negative e¤ect on pollution dominates so that the environmental tax in the more e¢ cient region decreases.
When we compare the environmental taxes the two regions face on a given good, we obtain Proposition 2 Under centrally set environmental policy, a good is taxed more heavily in the region which has a comparative advantage in its production, that is, t A a > t B a and t B b > t A b ; the tax di¤ erence is however smaller in the sector with a smaller productivity gap between the two regions and/or larger pollution
We can write the di¤erence in environmental taxes between the two regions as
If s a > s b and/or
A regional comparative advantage results in greater production which generates greater pollution (and higher marginal damages) and is thus taxed at a higher rate. As spillovers increase, the larger production of a good in the more e¢ cient region implies that more pollution spills over into the less e¢ cient region so that the tax on the good increases in the latter region by more than in the former region. For example, when s a increases, more pollution from the production of good a in region A spills over into region B
than from the production of that same good in region B into region A; while environmental taxes on the production of good a increase in both regions, the tax in region A increases by less than the tax in region B and the di¤erence between the two taxes, that is, t A a t B a decreases. When the productivity gap decreases and pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary so that total pollution increases in the more e¢ cient region, the total pollution increase in the less e¢ cient region exceeds that in the more e¢ cient region. As a result, the tax increase in the latter region falls short of that in the former region and the di¤erence between the two taxes thus decreases. That total pollution increases in the less e¢ cient region by more than in the more e¢ cient region follows from the fact that, unless pollution is perfectly transboundary (that is,
, lower production in the latter region has its strongest e¤ect in terms of pollution reduction locally and, similarly, higher production in the former region has its stronger e¤ect in terms of pollution increase locally.
When we compare the taxes on the two goods within a region, we have Proposition 3 Under centrally set environmental policy, the tax in the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage is larger than the tax in the other sector when s a = s b = s and
. However, if pollution is less transboundary in the more e¢ cient sector than in the other sector (e.g., s a < s b ), the tax di¤ erence (t A a t A b ) is smaller; on the other hand, if the inter-sectoral productivity gap the region faces is larger than that in other region (e.g.,
When s a = s b = s < 1 and
for j = A when i = a (so that i = b) and j = B when i = b (so that i = a). The positive tax di¤erential for 0 s < 1 stems from the greater pollution region j generates in sector i relative to sector i: the smaller the productivity gap between the two regions is in each of the two sectors (that is, the larger the ) and/or the more transboundary pollution is in each of the two sectors (that is, the larger the s), the smaller the tax di¤erential. In the extreme case in which pollution is a pure public bad in each of the two sectors (s = 1), region j faces the same tax in each sector independently of its relative e¢ ciency in sector i (or region j's relative e¢ ciency in sector i). In such a case, given that productivity gaps are the same in the two sectors, national production of good i is the same as that of good i so that the total amount of pollution region j faces from sector i is the same as that from sector i even though region j produces less of that good.
In the absence of inter-sectoral e¤ects in tax setting, as per (18) and (19), we have that
Using Proposition 1, we then obtain that, if s i < s i = s, the environmental tax region j faces on good i falls relative to the tax it faces on good i, and, if
= (that is, region j is more e¢ cient at producing good i relative to producing good i than region j is at producing good i relative to producing good i), the environmental tax region j faces on good i decreases relative to the tax it faces on good i. When the pollution from the production of good i in which region j has a comparative advantage is relatively local, it is possible for the tax on good i, where it has a comparative advantage, to be higher than the tax on good i. However, it is also possible for region j to face a higher tax on good i than on good i when good i's pollution is perfectly local. In fact, for s i = 0 < s i = s and 
which is always negative for any provided that 2 2 p 3 < s 1 and for the right so that it becomes less likely for the tax di¤erential to be negative. When pollution is perfectly local in sector i ( s = 0), total pollution region j faces in sector i decreases through lower local production in response to a decrease in productivity gap in sector i (that is, as , that is, the productivity gap in sector i becomes larger than the productivity gap in sector i, t j i decreases relative to t j i as total pollution region j faces in sector i falls through a decrease in local production which outweighs the production increase in region j.
Harmonized Taxes As central governments do not tend to resort to di¤erential tax systems, we further consider central policy under the constraint that taxes in a given sector be equal between the two regions (that is, taxes are harmonized). Letting t h i denote the harmonized tax rate in sector i (i = a; b), we derive the optimal environmental policy maximizing the country's welfare given in (14) as comprising
In comparison to the unharmonized taxes expressed in (18) and (19), the harmonized taxes are lower on goods in which regions have a comparative advantage but higher otherwise, that is,
Under harmonized taxes, the less e¢ cient region thus subsidizes the more e¢ cient region; the tax increase in the former (t h i t j i ) is however larger than the tax decrease (t j i t h i ) in the latter as long as pollution is not a pure public bad (see Appendix A). In fact, for s i < 1, the marginal environmental damage of production in sector i is greater in region j than in region j due to the quadratic nature of the damage function as region j, being the more e¢ cient producer in sector i, produces more of good i than region j. Hence, a unit tax reduction in sector i increases pollution in region j by more than a unit tax increase reduces pollution in region j so that the harmonized tax maximizing a country's welfare is chosen between t j i and t hence, the harmonized tax will be exactly equal to the average of the two unharmonized taxes.
In terms of environmental damages, the unharmonized policy always results in a better environment when pollution spillovers occur according to the same positive rate across sectors (i.e., 0 < s a = s b < 1) and productivity gaps are the same across regions (i.e., 0 < B a = A b < 1). 3 When moving to harmonization, the tax changes imply production increases in the comparative advantage sector but decreases in the other sector; in the absence of di¤erences in spillover e¤ects and productivity gaps, the production increase in the comparative advantage sector dominates so that, overall, environmental damages are larger under harmonization. However, it is possible for a region to enjoy a better environment under harmonized taxes if the pollution generated in the comparative advantage sector is more transboundary than the pollution generated in the other sector and/or if the cross-sectoral productivity gap it faces is smaller than the crosssectoral productivity gap the other region faces. An increase in s i reduces the gap between pollution under unharmonized taxes and pollution under harmonized taxes in sector i (through a reduction in the tax gap and thus in the production gap) but does not alter the pollution gap in sector i. Given that pollution from sector i is higher in region j but lower in region j (and, correspondingly, pollution from sector i is higher in region j but lower in region j) under harmonized taxes, the reduction in sector i's pollution gap that follows the increase in s i amounts not only to a lower pollution cost of harmonization in region j but also to a lower pollution bene…t of harmonization in region j. While the overall environmental cost of harmonization increases in region j (that is, the region which does not have a comparative advantage in sector i), region j may end up being environmentally better o¤ under harmonized policy as the reduction in the pollution gap in sector i may be such that the bene…t from lower pollution in sector i (which is not a¤ected by an increase in s i ) more than o¤sets the cost from higher pollution in sector i (which decreases following an increase in s i ). In Figure 2a , we illustrate the impact of an increase in s i on environmental damages given , depends on the production level of good i in region j: the more region j produces, the stronger the e¤ects of an increase in j i on good i's production levels in the two regions. As region j's production level of good i is lower under harmonized policy, an increase in j i increases the gap in good i's production between unharmonized and harmonized taxes in each region. However, a change in j i also a¤ects the tax gaps: a lower productivity gap between the two regions (i.e., a higher j i ) does in fact amount to less variation between the two regions in the absence of harmonization and thus to a lower tax e¤ect of harmonization; a lower tax gap then implies a lower gap between production under unharmonized taxes and production under harmonized taxes. The lower the productivity advantage that region j enjoys in sector i relative to region j is (that is, the higher j i is), the less e¤ective an increase in j i is in increasing region j's production of good i and the closer the taxes the two regions face in sector i under unharmonized policy are. 4 Hence, at high values of j i , the e¤ects of an increase in j i on the tax gaps tend to prevail and the production gaps thus tend to decrease, that is, harmonization tends to yield a lower production increase in the e¢ cient region and a lower production decrease in the other region. For a given s i , pollution is then more likely to decrease (increase) in region j and increase (decrease) in region j as 
Regional Environmental Policy
Under a decentralized system, each of the two regions (e.g., region j) chooses the environmental taxes to levy on the production of the two goods as to maximize its welfare which is given by
where e t j = h e t j a ; e t j b i is the vector of environmental taxes in region j and consumer surplus, producer surplus, tax revenue, and environmental damage in region j are expressed in (15) through (17) and (4), respectively. 4 Using (11), we have that
2 > 0 and
The
When we consider the sector in which a region does not have a comparative advantage (e.g., sector a for region B and sector b for region A) and compare the relevant centralized taxes given in (18) and (19) with the corresponding decentralized taxes given in (30) and (31), we obtain
Proposition 4
The environmental tax on the good which a region is less e¢ cient at producing is always higher under a centralized system than under a decentralized system, that is, t A b > e t A b and t B a > e t B a .
We can express the di¤erence in the environmental taxes region j faces on good i under the two policy regimes as where 1 , 2 , and 3 are positive parameters. 5 For the sector in which a region does not have a comparative advantage and must thus import from the other region, the inter-regional trade e¤ ect and the tax revenue e¤ ect work in the same direction to increase the marginal bene…t of environmental taxes. The combined positive e¤ect on tax setting stems from an increase in the value of trade and the additional tax revenues region j enjoys through higher production. At low values of s i , the inter-regional environmental trade e¤ ect works in the opposite direction to increase the marginal cost of environmental taxes as higher production in region j yields higher pollution. However, even in the extreme case when s i = 0 (that is, pollution is perfectly local in sector i), the combined positive e¤ect from trade and tax revenue more than o¤sets the negative environmental e¤ect so that, overall, the central government always opts for a higher tax than the regional government in the comparative advantage sector.
For the sector in which a region does have a comparative advantage, we instead obtain 5 Speci…cally, 1 = 3s Proposition 5 The environmental tax on the good which a region is more e¢ cient at producing is higher under a centralized system when the production of the good generates substantial pollution spillovers. For su¢ cently low values of s i , there exists however a productivity gap between the two regions above which the tax is higher under a decentralized system, with a smaller s i requiring a smaller productivity gap for the tax to be higher under a decentralized system.
We 
In the determination of the environmental tax on the good in which a region has a comparative advantage, the inter-regional environmental e¤ ect and tax revenue e¤ ect work in the same manner as in the setting of the tax on the ine¢ ciently produced good above considered, increasing the tax rate as spillovers increase.
However, the inter-regional trade e¤ ect not only works in the opposite direction as lower taxes generate bene…ts to consumers in two regions rather than one, thus decreasing the tax rate, but is also larger in magnitude because of the larger price e¤ect of the tax in the more e¢ cient sector. When pollution is perfectly local, the inter-regional environmental e¤ ect consists solely of the own pollution e¤ect and thus reenforces the inter-regional trade e¤ ect in lowering the central tax relative to the regional tax. As pollution becomes less local, the spillover e¤ect increases, counteracting the own pollution e¤ect and eventually changing the direction of the inter-regional environmental e¤ ect. For a given productivity gap between the two regions, there exists a s i above which the positive inter-regional environmental e¤ ect coupled 6 Speci…cally, 1 = 7s with the tax revenue e¤ ect more than o¤sets the negative inter-regional trade e¤ ect and the central tax is greater than the regional tax. The smaller the productivity gap between the two regions is, the weaker the inter-regional trade e¤ ect because of the lower trade volume and thus the smaller the spillover e¤ect that is necessary for the central tax to be greater than the regional tax. We show the critical value of s i
the di¤erence is however smaller under a centralized system, that is, t j i 
where 1 , 2 , and 3 are positive parameters. 7 We can then conclude that, when central taxes are greater than local taxes in both sectors, the tax premium under a centralized system is larger in the region that is less e¢ cient at producing the good, that is, t j i e t j i > t j i e t j i . The presence of the inter-regional trade e¤ ect in the setting of central taxes is at the core of this result: a tax increase in the sector in which a region enjoys an exporting position yields a price increase that generates a net cost to the importing region as the gain in producer surplus falls short of the loss in consumer surplus. A tax increase in the sector in which a region imports yields a price increase that generates a net bene…t to the exporting region as the gain in producer surplus more than o¤sets the loss in consumer surplus. Hence, the inter-regional trade e¤ ect serves to curb the central government's incentive to impose higher taxes for goods regions export but to re-enforce it for goods regions import.
When we compare the taxes within a given region, we …nd that, as in the central policy case, the good in which the region has a comparative advantage may be taxed at a higher or lower rate depending on di¤erences in the transboundary nature of pollution between the two production processes as well as di¤erences in comparative advantage between the two regions. The tax di¤erential, which is positive and equal to the within sector tax di¤erential given in (36) in the absence of di¤erences in spillover e¤ects 7 Speci…cally, 1 = 2s and productivity gaps, is however monotonic in each of the four parameters, namely, s a , s b , 
Therefore, the stronger the pollution spillovers of good i are relative to the pollution spillovers of good i, the higher the tax region j faces on good i, the good which it produces more e¢ ciently and thus it exports to the other region, relative to the tax it faces on good i. Consistently with this result, we have that
. Although a reduction in the comparative advantage region j enjoys in the production of good i has the same qualitative e¤ect on the tax di¤erential as a reduction in the comparative advantage region j enjoys in the production of good i, the latter has a stronger e¤ect as re ‡ected in ; in other words, a decrease in the productivity advantage region j has in the production of good i (i.e., increase in j i ) reduces the tax region j pays on good i relative to the tax it pays on good i by a smaller amount than an equal decrease in the productivity advantage region j has in the production of good i (i.e., increase in j i ). 8 An increase in productivity increases production in the importing region by more than it decreases production in the exporting region. This di¤erential e¤ect on production has implications for a region's incentive to increase or decrease its environmental tax in the a¤ected sector.
Trade increases the cost of taxation in the importing region but decreases it (or, equivalently, increases the bene…t of taxation) in the exporting region; the larger the volume of trade volume is, the higher the cost or bene…t of taxation is depending on the direction of trade. A larger increase in production in the importing region in response to an increase in productivity (which results in less dependence on imports in spite of the increase in local consumption following a price reduction) amounts to a larger reduction in the cost of taxation, or a stronger weakening of the incentive to lower the tax on the imported good, than 8 The e¤ect of on the tax di¤erence can be written in terms of the reduction in the bene…t of taxation in the exporting region from a decrease in production and thus exports. 9 Hence, a decrease in productivity gap has a stronger tax e¤ect in the importing region. 10 In setting taxes, a region takes into account the e¤ects that these instruments have on total surplus, tax revenues, and environmental damages. Independently of whether the region has a comparative advantage in a given sector, it faces a trade-o¤ between generating more tax revenues through greater production which requires lower taxes and keeping the environment cleaner through lower production and thus higher taxes. The tax e¤ect on total surplus is however linked to the direction and extent of trade and therefore to the presence and extent of a comparative advantage; a tax increase does in fact generate net bene…ts through higher prices of exports (in the comparative advantage sector) but net costs through higher prices of imports (in the other sector). The additional bene…ts of taxes on goods regions are more e¢ cient at producing translate into higher taxes; conversely, the additional costs of taxes on goods regions are less e¢ cient at producing translate into lower taxes. Clearly, the larger the extent of trade is as a result of a greater productivity gap between the two regions, the greater the revenue from exports or the cost of imports is; hence, as the volume of trade increases, the exporting region faces a stronger incentive to increase its tax while the importing region faces a stronger incentive to decrease its tax. Correspondingly, the smaller the productivity gap is, the smaller the revenue from exports or the cost of imports is and the weaker the exporting region's incentive to increase its tax or the importing region's incentive to decrease its tax. This convergence of incentives amounts to a decrease in the tax gap between exporting and importing regions within a given sector and between exporting and importing sectors within a given region.
Aside from di¤erences in the direction of incentives stemming from trade considerations, there exist di¤erences in the strength of incentives arising from environmental considerations. As long as pollution generated in a given sector is not perfectly transboundary, its level and the associated bene…t of a tax increase are higher in the region that produces more, that is, the region with a comparative advantage.
The more transboundary pollution is in a given sector, the smaller the pollution gap between the two regions and, correspondingly, the smaller the tax gap. Put di¤erently, although each region faces a larger pollution level and thus a greater incentive to increase its tax as pollution becomes more transboundary, the importing region (that is, the region producing less), faces a larger increase in pollution and thus a 9 A decrease in productivity gap between the two regions reduces the price level and thus increases local consumption in both regions. Exports thus fall by more than local production.
1 0 The tax implications of the di¤erential e¤ect on production of a decrease in productivity gap may also be linked to environmental considerations. In fact, unless pollution in the exporting sector is substantially more transboundary than pollution in the importing sector, overall pollution increases in the latter by more than in the former, thus providing a region with additional incentives to increase its tax on the imported good. A decrease in productivity gap in the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage does in fact reduce pollution in that sector, provided that its spillover e¤ects are not signi…cant.
greater incentive to increase its tax.
Finally, when we compare the above tax di¤erential under the two policy regimes, we have that
that is, the tax di¤erential is always smaller under a centralized system. In fact, as 
Assessing the Environment: Central versus Regional Policy
In assessing the environmental impact of central policy versus local policy, we compare the environmental damages in region j under the two tax regimes. We initially consider a situation in which productivity gaps are the same between the two regions and spillover e¤ects are the same between the two goods. Our initial case involves s i = s and j i = so that we need only assess environmental di¤erences for one of the two regions (e.g., region j).
Using the damage function given in (4), the central taxes in (18) and (19) , and the local taxes in (30) and (31) and that db s ( ) d 
Therefore, when pollution is perfectly local, centrally set policy always yields greater damages; when pollution is perfectly transboundary, locally set policy always yields greater damages. When the two regions face the same productivity gap between sectors and the two production processes involve the same spillover rates, we then conclude that damages are always smaller under a central policy regime for taxes. Put di¤erently, the larger the productivity gap between the two sectors, the more likely it is for a decentralized system to be preferable to a centralized system from an environmental point of view. In terms of Figure 4 , damages are smaller with locally set taxes below (or to the left of) the b s curve.
Before we consider the implications of relaxing the assumption that s = = 1, we look at the di¤erence in environmental damages relative to the di¤erence in taxes between the two regions. To be clear, we are interested in whether there exists consistency between the two di¤erences whereby higher As the environmental damage function is separable in pollutants emitted in di¤erent sectors, the level of pollution each sector contributes to is only dependent on the environmental policy in place in that sector both at home (own e¤ect) as well as in the other region (cross e¤ect). The own and cross e¤ects of environmental policy work in opposite directions but the former is always larger in magnitude than the latter. Furthermore, if pollution is transboundary, the net e¤ect of a switch from local governments to a central government (and thus a change in environmental policy) on the pollution level a region faces in a given sector is ultimately detemined by the size of the own and cross e¤ects of its environmetal policy in that sector relative to the own and cross e¤ects of the other region's environmental policy in the same sector. 13 Given that the switch always triggers an increase in the environmental tax in the sector in which a region is less productive but either a decrease in the environmental tax in the more e¢ cient sector or an increase that is however smaller than both the tax increase experienced by the same region in the less e¢ cient sector (0 < dt See appendix for more detail. 1 3 Own and cross e¤ects of environmental policy are given in Table 2a . Net e¤ects of changes in environmental policy resulting from replacing a dentralized regime with a centralized regime are given in Table 2b . Tables 2a and 2b and depicted in Figures 5a and 5b , an increase in t j i decreases the pollution level region j faces in sector i when t j i increases (that is, region j, which has a comparative advantage in sector i, experiences a tax increase in the same sector) for any degree of transboundary pollution (any s) and productivity gap (any ), as well as when t j i decreases provided that the productivity gap between the two regions is not excessively large. An increase in t j i is however less likely to decrease the pollution level region j faces in sector i unless pollution spillovers are so signi…cant that the e¤ect from the pollution decrease in the other region dominates. At lower s values, this dominance disappears and larger values are then necessary to reduce the inter-regional trade e¤ ect in order to increase the relevance of the increase in t j i which reduces region j's production of good i and to decrease the relevance of the increase in t j i which increases region j's production of pollution of good i.
To clarify, let us consider the e¤ects of tax changes from a shift to centralism in region A which has a comparative advantage in sector a and thus experiences a tax increase in sector b (t A b ") and either a tax decrease or a smaller tax increase in sector On the other hand, if region B's tax decreases, production increases in region B but decreases in region A; the own e¤ect of the decrease in t B b thus re-enforces the cross e¤ect of the increase in t A b , provided that s b > 0, increasing region A's pollution, while the cross e¤ect re-enforces the own e¤ect of the increase in t A b decreasing region A's pollution. As the own e¤ect is always larger in the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage, it is possible, as long as s b > 0, for the overall positive e¤ect on pollution (from own e¤ect of decrease in t B b and cross e¤ect of increase in t A b ) to more than o¤set the overall negative e¤ect (from cross e¤ect of decrease in t B b and own e¤ect of increase in t A b ). It turns out that a su¢ cient, although not necessary, condition for the net e¤ect on pollution to be negative is that some minimum productivity level be achieved in sector b by region A. In fact, the more productive region A is in sector b (or the less ine¢ cient region A is relative to region B), the weaker the dominance of the own e¤ect of the decrease in t B b relative to the own e¤ect of the increase in t A b . For very low values of A b , it is still possible for the net e¤ect on pollution to be negative and we illustrate the possibility in Figure 5a as the two areas labelled P 1 , with the area labelled P 2 then giving cases in which the net e¤ect on pollution is positive.
For the net impact of shifting to centralism on the pollution level in the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage, we can sum up the above e¤ects from the perspective of region B. when region A's contribution to region B's pollution is substantial (that is, s b > 1=3); for s b < 1=3, it is still quite possible for region B's pollution to be lower under central taxes, as we illustrate in Figure 5b with the area labelled P 3 , but not for every feasible value of On the other hand, a decrease in t B b re-enforces the positive e¤ect that the increase in t A b has on region B's production of good b and, overall, causes region B's pollution in sector b to always increase when region A's contribution is not substantial (or s b < 1=3); for s b > 1=3, it is still quite possible for region B's pollution to be higher under central taxes, as we illustrate in Figure 5b with the area labelled P 2 , but not for every feasible value of 
Similarly, for region j, we obtain the following e¤ects: In terms of the e¤ects of changes in s and on taxes, we are particularly interested in the tax on the good a region is more e¢ cient at producing (that is, good i in region j and good i in region j) under central policy versus federal policy. As the central tax on the good a region is less e¢ cient at producing is always larger then the corresponding federal tax, the question of whether changes in s and/or impact the likelihood of central policy yielding higher or lower taxes is not applicable. Hence, when we consider the tax di¤erence for the sector in which a region has a comparative advantage, we have
Proposition 9
The less polluting good i is relative to good i, the more likely it is for the tax on good i in region j, which has a comparative advantage in its production, to be lower under central policy. The larger region j's comparative advantage relative to region j's comparative advantage, the more likely it is for the tax on the good i in region j, which has a comparative advantage in its production, to be lower under central policy.
A decrease in s yields a decrease in t When s i < s i = s ( s < 1), the spillover e¤ect is weaker in sector i and the corresponding gap between the central tax and the local tax is thus smaller in region j. What happens to the gap in region j depends on whether the the di¤erence between the two taxes is positive or negative when s = 1: if it is positive, the weakening in spillover e¤ect amounts to a lower gap; if it is negative, it amounts to a larger gap (larger negative di¤erence between the central tax and the local tax). As the spillover e¤ect in a region is a positive function of the production level in the other region and as region j produces more of good i than region j, a less transboundary pollution in sector i involves a larger drop in the tax gap in region j than in region j, that is,
> 0 (the comparison is meaningful when the central tax on good i is higher than the local tax in the less productive region, that is, region j).
Thus, a region that has a comparative advantage in the sector with greater spillovers (e.g., region j when s i > s i ) faces a lower tax gap between the two tax regimes in the less productive sector (e.g., sector i) and, provided that the central tax is larger than the local tax, a larger gap in the more productive sector.
If, however, the central tax in the comparative advantage sector is lower than the local tax as a result of a strong inter-regional trade e¤ ect (or a large volume of trade with the other region), the region faces a lower tax gap in its e¢ cient (and more polluting) sector. The lower central taxes in the sector with weaker spillovers amount to larger environmental damages under centralization so that the damage gap between the two tax systems is larger in both regions when the di¤erence between central and local damages is positive and smaller when the di¤erence is negative. If the central tax is instead lower than the local tax in the comparative advantage sector so that production is greater under centralization, lower spillovers in this sector have greater bene…ts in terms of a reduction in environmental damages in the region receiving the spillovers under centralization. It is then possible for these additional bene…ts to outweigh the additional costs of lower spillovers under a central tax regime (that is, a greater production increase through a greater tax reduction) when the inter-regional trade e¤ ect is strong and/or the spillover e¤ ect is very weak. A region that is less e¢ cient in the sector with fewer spillovers may thus face a lower gap in environmental damages when it exports heavily from, and/or receives less pollution from, the other region (e.g., when s i < s i , region j may end up with a lower damage gap between the two tax systems at low values of j i and/or s i ).
, we have a stronger inter-regional trade e¤ ect in sector i which decreases the central tax in region j but increases it in region j, a weaker tax revenue e¤ ect which decreases the central tax in both regions, and a change in the inter-regional environmental e¤ ect which increases the central tax in region j if the own pollution e¤ect dominates or decreases the central tax in region j if the spillover e¤ect dominates but has otherwise ambiguous e¤ects. Overall, however, the gap between the central tax and the local tax on good i is always smaller in region j and smaller in region j if the di¤erence between the central and local taxes is positive when = 1 but larger if the di¤erence is negative when = 1. Because of the di¤erent implications of a strengthening of the inter-regional trade e¤ ect for the tax gap depending on whether the sector is the more or less e¢ cient one, a lower productivity gap in sector i involves a larger drop in the tax gap in region j than in region j, that is,
> 0 (the comparison is meaningful when the central tax on good i is higher than the local tax in the more productive region, that is, region j).
A region with a comparative advantage in the sector characterized by a larger productivity gap (e.g., region j when 1 j i > 1 j i ) then faces a greater tax gap between the two tax regimes in the less productive sector (e.g., sector i) and, provided that the central tax is larger than the local tax, a lower gap in the more productive sector (e.g., sector i). If, however, the central tax in the comparative advantage sector is lower than the local tax, the region faces a larger tax gap in its e¢ cient sector. In terms of environmental damages, the productivity gap increase in one of the two sectors raises production in the more e¢ cient region and decreases it in the less e¢ cient region under either of the two tax systems.
However, although overall damages may decrease under both centralization and decentralization if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary, the presence of the inter-regional trade e¤ ect results in a larger production increase in the more e¢ cient region under central taxes so that the damage gap between the two tax regimes increases in the more e¢ cient region (e.g., j e j increases when j i decreases). In the less e¢ cient region, environmental damages decrease under both tax systems as the production decrease (and thus pollution decrease) the region experiences due to the increase in productivity gap more than outweighs the production increase (and thus increase in pollution that spills over) in the more productive region.
When the productivity gap is larger, the damage decrease under centralization can be smaller or larger than the damage decrease under decentralization and, correspondingly, the damage gap can be larger or smaller. To understand the reason, we can think of the e¤ect of a productivity gap change on production in the less e¢ cient region as comprising a direct (positive) e¤ect at given tax rates as captured in (11) which depends on the level of production and indirect (negative) e¤ects through tax changes. Due to the interregional trade e¤ ect, a larger productivity gap triggers smaller decreases in central taxes which amount to weaker indirect e¤ects and thus contribute to increasing the overall (positive) e¤ect of a productivity gap change on production. However, also due to the inter-regional trade e¤ ect, the production level is smaller under central taxes and the resulting smaller direct e¤ect thus contributes to decreasing the overall e¤ect of a productivity gap change. For a given degree of transboundary pollution, the smaller the productivity gap is, the smaller the production gap between the two tax regimes is: the magnitude of the overall e¤ect of a productivity gap change on production is then more likely to be determined by di¤erences in indirect e¤ects and production in the less productive region is thus more likely to decrease by more under central taxes in response to a productivity gap increase. For a given productivity gap, the less transboundary pollution is, the more relevant the inter-regional trade e¤ ect is: di¤erences in indirect e¤ects between the two tax regimes are then more important and production in the less productive region is thus more likely to decrease by more under central taxes in response to a productivity gap increase. Therefore, under centralization, the damage gap increases as the productivity gap increases when production in the less productive region falls by less but may decrease when it falls by more. 15 If we take into account both the e¤ects on environmental daamges and the e¤ects on taxes, 16 we …nd that, under central policy, lower taxes are less likely to be accompanied by smaller environmental damages whenever changes in s or have no impact on taxes. However, when central taxes decrease relative to federal taxes in response to a decrease in s or in , smaller taxes are more likely to be accompanied by smaller environmental damages under central policy. In fact, the likelihood that region j faces both a lower tax on good i and lower environmental damages under central policy actually increases despite that region j is less likely to face a higher tax on good i under centralized policy, but is also less likely to enjoy a better environment when good i has smaller pollution spillovers than good i, as we illustrate in Figures 9a and   9b . Similarly, under central policy, region j is less likely to face a higher tax on good i (i.e., the good in which it has a comparative advantage) but is also less likely to experience lower environmental damages when its comparative advantage in sector i is not as strong as region j's comparative advantage in sector i; nevertheless, the e¤ect on the tax dominates the e¤ect on the environment so that, overall, region j is more likely to face both a lower tax on good i and lower environmental damages under central policy. 17 
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the role of federalism versus centralism in the determination of environmental taxes. Comparing federalism and centralism, we are interested in the impact on both the individual taxes set on pollutants by the regional or central government(s) and the e¤ect on total pollution damages in the country. 1 5 That production in the less productive region fall by more under central taxes is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the damage gap to decrease in response to an increase in productivity gap. 1 6 We are interested here in cases in which central taxes can be lower or higher than federal taxes depending on the values of s and . Hence, we ignore instances in which central taxes are always higher than federal taxes, although decreases in s and reduce the extent to which the former exceed the latter. To be clear, we do not consider taxes on goods regions are less e¢ cient at producing but which are a¤ected by changes in s and . 1 7 We summarize these changes in Table 4 .
In the sector of regional comparative advantage, greater output generates increased pollution, which, at least without harmonization of central policy, results in taxes that are higher in the sector of the regional comparative advantage good when spillovers across regional boundaries and productivity gaps between sectors are symmetric. However, as spillovers of pollution decrease in the comparative advantage industry, the gap between the taxes on the two sectors decreases, and can potentially become negative.
On the other hand, as the productivity gap in the production of the two goods increases (implying a larger comparative advantage), the gap between the taxes increases. Across regions, increased taxes in the comparative advantage industry results in lower local production and pollution but higher production and pollution in the other region.
As a result, independently of the degree of spillovers, we show that federalism results in weaker policy (lower taxes) than centralism on the good for which a region does not have a comparative advantage (that is, for the good that is less e¢ ciently produced in a region). For the production of the more e¢ cient good, federalism can lead to taxes that are higher or lower than centralized taxes, depending on the degree of inter-regional spillovers of pollution and the productivity gap between sectors. Despite the fact that centralism always leads to stronger policy in one of the goods, total environmental damages in a country can still be lower under federalism, particularly when spillovers are low or the productivity gap is large. In these cases, the environmental externality e¤ect from pollution spillovers is dominated by a cross-regional competition e¤ect. The centralized government lowers taxes on e¢ cient good production to encourage inter-regional trade and increase the welfare of consumers (and to a lesser extent, producers). As this occurs, weaker centralized policy in the more e¢ cient sector can possibly o¤set the stronger policy set in the less e¢ cient sector and results in higher centralized damages.
Previous literature has suggested that lobbying and …rm location competition under federalism can lead to a "race to the bottom," where regions push down environmental taxes (or weaken environmental standards) in an attempt to improve their position relative to other regions. Here, we have identi…ed other e¤ects which tends to weaken centralized policy, through the channels of multiple polluting goods and regional comparative advantage. If the gap between productivities in regional industries is large (and spillovers are not too high), federalism can actually lead to stronger (overall) environmental policy and lower environmental damages than centralism.
Appendix

Inter-regional Environmental E¤ ect: Changes in s and
The inter-regional environmental e¤ ect depends on both s according to In terms of the e¤ect of a change in , if the own pollution e¤ect dominates, N 2 > 0; furthermore, assuming that sector i is the one in which region j does not have a comparative advantage, we know, from (11) , that N 1 = 
Proposition 1: E¤ects of s and on Centrally Set Taxes
By partially di¤erentiating (18) and (19) both of which are positive; hence, the greater the spillover e¤ects of production, the more heavily production is taxed. Similarly, by partially di¤erentiating (18) and (19) with respect to which is always positive; hence, as the productivity gap between the two regions narrows, the tax in the less e¢ cient region always increases while the tax in the more e¢ cient region increases provided that s i > 0:1716.
Harmonized versus Unharmonized Taxes
We can write di¤erences between the unharmonized taxes given in (18) and (19) and the harmonized taxes given in (27) and (28) 
